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I n  t h e  f i f t h  c e n t u r y  b .c ., Euripides addressed "those who  
patiently endure long illnesses" as follows:
I hate the men who would prolong their lives 
By foods and drinks and charms of magic art 
Perverting nature's course to keep off death 
They ought, when they no longer serve the land 
To quit this life, and clear the way for youth .1
These lines express a view again stirring controversy: that the 
elderly who are irreversibly ill, whose lives can be continued only 
with substantial medical support, ought not to be given treatment; 
instead, their lives should be brought to an end. It should be recog­
nized, as one contemporary political figure is said to have put it, that 
they "have a duty to die . " 2
Although this controversy achieves a new urgency as pressures for 
containment of health care costs escalate, the notion is hardly new  
that there is a time for the ill elderly to die, a time at which they are 
obligated to bring their lives to an end or allow others to do so. A
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number of conspicuous voices throughout history have advanced 
such a notion, variously recommending denial of treatment, euthana­
sia, or socially-assisted "rational" suicide as a means of bringing it 
about. Plato, for instance, said that the chronically ill or disabled 
patient ought to refuse medical treatment, and if he cannot return to 
work, simply d ie .3 In Thomas More's Utopia, the priests and magis­
trates are to urge the person who suffers a painful incurable illness 
"to make the decision not to nourish such a painful disease any 
longer," and to "deliver himself from the scourge and imprisonment 
of living or let others release him ." 4 Nietzsche claimed that the 
physician should administer a "fresh dose of disgust," rather than a 
prescription, to the sick man who "continues to vegetate in a state of 
cowardly dependence upon doctors" and who thus becomes a "para­
site" on society; it is "indecent," he says, "to go on living ." 5
Not only have individual thinkers recommended such practices, 
but a variety of primitive and historical societies appear to have 
engaged in them. Although the anthropological data may not be fully 
reliable, there seems to be evidence of a variety of senicide practices, 
variously involving abandonment, direct killing, or socially enforced 
suicide. The Eskimo, for instance, are reported to have practiced 
suicide in old age "not merely to be rid of a life that is no longer a 
pleasure, but also to relieve their nearest relations of the trouble they 
give them ." 6 The early Japanese are said to have taken their elderly to 
a mountain top to d ie .7 Various migratory American Indian tribes 
abandoned their infirm members by the side of the trail. At least 
while it was under siege, the Greeks on the island of Ceos required 
persons reaching the age of sixty-five to commit suicide. Except 
within the school headed by Hippocrates, Greek physicians ap­
parently made euthanasia or assistance in suicide available to those 
whose illnesses they could not cure, and there is some evidence that 
the hemlock was developed for this purpose .8 Greek and Roman 
Stoics—most notably Seneca—recommended suicide as the responsi­
ble act of the wise man, who ought not assign overly great impor­
tance to mere life itself, but rather achieve the disengagement and 
wisdom required to end his own life at the appropriate time. Of 
course, not all of these practices have been humane, either in their 
initial intent or in their final outcome; although the early Nazi 
euthanasia program known as T4, which practiced active termination 
of the lives of chronically ill, debilitated, or retarded Aryans, was 
advertised as a benefit to these persons as well as to the state, it 
became the training ground for concentration camp personnel.9 But 
although practices that range from recommending refusal of medical 
treatment to encouraging suicide to deliberate, involuntary killing 
may seem to differ sharply in their ethical characteristics, there is
nevertheless an important, central similarity: they are all the practices 
of societies that communicate to their members that when they reach 
advanced old age or become irreversibly ill, it is time to die, and that 
they have an obligation to acquiesce or cooperate in bringing this 
about. The question to be explored here, in the light of current issues 
concerning distributive justice in health care, is whether there is any 
moral warrant at all to this view, and if so,precisely what conse­
quences this would have for the health care of the aged.
The Economics of Health Care for the Aged
In contemporary society, a discomforting set of economic facts brings 
this issue into prominence. Health care use by the aged constitutes a 
major component of medical spending, and exacerbates that scarcity 
of medical resources that generates distributive dilemmas in the first 
place. People reaching old age, and especially those entering extreme 
old age, are people for whom late life dependency has or may become 
a reality, for whom medical care expenses are likely to escalate, and 
for whom needs for custodial and nursing care will increase. Three 
out of four deaths of persons of all ages in the United States occur as a 
result of degenerative diseases, and the proportion is much higher in 
old age;10 the multiple infirmities and extended downhill course 
characteristic of these diseases greatly elevates the need for medical 
care. People over 65 use medical services at 3.5 times the rate of those 
below 65." In 1981, the 11 percent of the population over 65 used 39.3 
percent of short-stay hospital days, and the 4.4 percent over 75 used 
20.7 percent.12 There are now about six million octogenarians, and the 
federal government provides an estimated $51 billion in transfers and 
services to them .13 People 80 years of age or older consume, on 
average, 77 percent more medical benefits than those between 65 and 
79.14 Nursing home residents number about 1.5 million, of whom 90 
percent are 65 or over, at an average cost of $20,000 per year.15 
Although only 4.7 percent of persons 65 or over are in nursing 
homes, rates rise with age. About one percent of persons 65-74 are in 
nursing homes; of those 75-84, seven percent, and of those 85 and 
over, about 20 percent are in nursing homes on any given day.16 Even 
so, institutionalized persons represent a comparatively small fraction 
of the elderly suffering chronic illnesses and disabilities, and it is 
estimated that for every nursing home resident, there are two other 
people with equivalent disabilities in the community.17 Even if a 
person maintains functional independence into old age, the risk of 
becoming frail for a prolonged period is still high: for independent 
persons between 65 and 69, one study found, total life expectancy 
was 16.5 years, but "active life expectancy," or the portion of the
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remaining years that were characterized by independence, was only 
ten years, and the remaining 6.5 years were characterized by major 
functional impairment. Furthermore, this risk increases with age: 
persons who were independent at 85 were likely to spend 60 percent 
of their remaining 7.3 years requiring assistance.18 Expenditures are 
particularly large for those who are about to die: for instance, for 
Medicare enrollees in 1976, the average reimbursement for those in 
their last year of life was 6.2 times as large as for those who survived 
at least two years, and although those who died comprised only 5.9 
percent of Medicare enrollees, they accounted for 27.9 percent of 
program expenditures.19 Thirty percent of all expenses of decedents 
occurred in the last 30 days of life, 46 percent in the last 60 days, and 
77 percent in the last six months of life.20 While this figure is not 
confined to deaths among the elderly, a 1983 survey of cancer deaths 
for Blue Cross/Blue Shield predicted that the average American who 
died of cancer in that year would incur more than $22,000 of illness- 
related expenses during the final year of life.21
Clearly, contemporary analogues of the practices of the historical 
and primitive societies mentioned above, ranging from refusal or 
denial of treatment to outright senicide and societally mandated 
suicide, would have pronounced impact upon the health care re­
sources available for other persons in society. It is this that gives rise 
to the painful distributive question to be examined here. If scarcity 
precludes granting all persons within society all the care they need for 
all medical conditions that might arise, some persons or some condi­
tions must be reduced or excluded from care. But if so, it is often held, 
those excluded should be the elderly ill: after all, the medical condi­
tions from which they suffer are often extraordinarily expensive to 
treat; the prognosis, as age increases, is increasingly poor; and in any 
case, they have already lived full life spans and had claim to a fair 
share of societal resources. It is this view, or constellation of views, 
that seems to underlie and motivate practices suggesting that there is 
a time for the elderly to die.
Justice and Age Rationing
If societal resources are insufficient to provide all the health care all 
persons in all medical conditions need, some sort of limiting distribu­
tive practice will of necessity emerge. Several recent writers have 
argued that rather than let the market control the distribution of 
health care, a rationally defended rationing policy can be developed 
under accepted principles of justice, and that this policy will justify 
rationing by age: old people should be the first to be excluded from 
medical care. However, assuming the underlying formal principle of
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justice to require that like cases and groups be treated alike, it is by no 
means initially clear that plausible material principles of justice will 
differentiate the elderly from other claimants for care. For instance, if 
an individual's claim to care were taken to be a function of the 
contributions society may expect as a return on its investment in him, 
this might seem to support age rationing, disfavoring those no longer 
capable of making contributions; but of course the elderly have 
already made contributions, contributions that are, in fact, more 
secure than the potential contributions of the young. Alternatively, it 
might be argued that the elderly have greater claims to care in virtue 
of their greater vulnerability, in virtue of the respect owed elders, or 
in virtue of the intrinsic value of old age. This sort of discussion, 
characteristic of many analyses of distributive justice, involves identi­
fying the possible desert bases of claims to health care, and then 
considering whether the elderly can satisfy these conditions as well as 
other age groups. If they can (which I think likely), policies that 
restrict the access of the elderly to health care must be seen as the 
product of simple age bias.
But an influential conceptual observation has been made by Nor­
man Daniels.22 Most analyses of distributive justice, Daniels observes, 
assume that the elderly constitute one among a variety of age groups, 
including infants, adolescents, and the middle-aged, all of whom 
compete for scarce resources in health care. But this, in Daniels' view, 
is misleading; the elderly should be viewed as the same persons at a 
later stage of their lives. The mistake lies in considering distributive 
problems as problems in allocating resources among competing 
groups and among competing individuals, when they are more 
correctly understood as problems of allocating resources throughout 
the duration of lives. Given this conceptual shift, Daniels then em­
ploys Rawlsian strategies to determine just allocations of care. He 
considers what distributive policies prudential savers—the rational, 
self-interest-maximizing parties of the Rawlsian original position— 
would adopt if, unable to know their own medical conditions, genetic 
predispositions, physical susceptibilities, environmental situations, 
health maintenance habits, or ages, they must decide in advance on a 
spending plan budgeting a fixed amount of medical care across their 
whole lives. He quite plausibly conjectures that prudential savers 
behind the veil of ignorance in this original position would choose, 
where scarcity obtains, to allocate a greater amount of resources to 
care and treatment required for conditions that occur earlier in life, 
from infancy through middle age, but not to underwrite treatment 
that would prolong life beyond its normal span. By freeing resources 
that might otherwise have been devoted to prolonging the lives of the 
elderly, so that they are used instead to treat diseases that cause death
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or disability earlier in life, such a policy would maximize one's 
chances of receiving a reasonable amount of life within the normal 
species-typical, age-relative opportunity range. (Presumably, such a 
policy would not allocate extensive care to severely defective neo­
nates, catastrophically and irreversibly damaged accident victims, or 
other persons whose medical prognoses are so dismal that the pros­
pect of achieving even remotely normal species-typical, age-relative 
opportunity is extremely poor. Thus, savings resulting from rationing 
care to the elderly would not be entirely consumed in treating the 
worst-off newborns or others in similarly hopeless circumstances, 
and the "black hole" problem would be avoided.) If this is a policy 
upon which prudential savers would agree, Daniels holds, it will 
show that—at least under scarcity conditions against a background of 
just institutions—age-rationing is morally warranted for making allo­
cations of health care.
But this leaves unanswered a crucial issue of application. If, in a 
situation of scarcity, a rationally defended rationing policy for health 
care resources is more just than market control, and if the most just 
form of rationing for health care is rationing by age, this still does not 
determine what policies and practices for putting age-rationing into 
effect are themselves just. Arguments for rationing are always mor­
ally incomplete without attention to the crucial details of precisely 
how such policies are to be given effect, since intolerable features of 
such policies may force reconsideration of the rationing strategy from 
the start. Thus, employing Daniels's Rawlsian strategy, it is necessary 
to consider what age-rationing policies rational self-interest maximiz­
ers in the original position would accept.
Whatever merits it may have as an application of the Rawlsian 
conception of justice, Daniels's strategy is intuitively attractive for 
assessing the moral justifiability of age-rationing in health care. This 
is because those of us considering this issue—who would be prepared 
to develop policy requirements on the basis of these considerations 
and who would be governed by whatever policies might be devised— 
are effectively behind the "veil of ignorance" with respect to the 
specific events of our own aging and death. While Rawls claims that 
we can enter the original position any time simply by reasoning for 
principles of justice in accordance with the appropriate restrictions on 
not taking into account one's own specific interests,23 such self­
restriction is hardly necessary: when considering issues of justice 
with respect to aging and death, we are already there. It is, of course, 
true that most persons who are reasonably familiar with background 
medical and genetic information and who have some knowledge of 
their own ancestry, previous health history, and health maintenance 
habits are not completely ignorant of the probable circumstances of
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their own aging and death. Yet they are able to eliminate with 
certainty only a very few types and causes of death (e.g., specific 
hereditary diseases for which one is not at risk), and to assign rough 
probabilities to the likelihood of contracting the major killer diseases. 
Even those with early symptoms of a disease syndrome cannot be 
sure that some other fatal condition will not intervene. What they are 
not able to do is prospectively identify with certainty the actual cause 
of their own deaths or the precise events of a future terminal course. 
By and large, persons still in a position to consider the issue of health 
care age-rationing for the elderly and to develop policy responses do 
not yet know when or how they will age and die. But we are all in this 
position, and we find ourselves obliged to evaluate policies and 
applications of age-rationing practices without knowing how they 
will affect our own interests when the time comes. Yet despite the fact 
that we thus replicate the Rawlsian original position quite naturally, 
our reluctance to look squarely at death and its often unpleasant 
circumstances may undermine both the rationality and the justice of 
the death-related policies we adopt.
If the Rawls/Daniels strategy is employed, then, possible practices 
and policies for effecting age-rationing, including denial or refusal of 
treatment, senicide, euthanasia, and socially mandated "rational" 
suicide, are to be assessed in terms of whether rational self-interest 
maximizers behind the veil of ignorance would agree to accept such 
policies or not. However, despite the analogy between the lack of 
specific knowledge characteristic of parties to the original position 
and the lack of specific knowledge characteristic of ordinary persons 
who have not yet reached old age or death, what rational self-interest 
maximizers in the original position would agree to cannot be deter­
mined simply by inspecting the age and death-related choices of 
ordinary persons now. This is because the kinds of choices we 
ordinary persons make are very heavily determined by social expec­
tation and custom, legal and religious restrictions, paternalistic prac­
tices in medicine, financial limitations, and so on. Furthermore, as 
ordinary persons, we may fail both to realize what our own self­
interests actually are and to choose the most efficient means of 
satisfying them. Consequently, it is necessary to consider—as far as 
possible independently of cultural constraints—what policies for put­
ting age-rationing into practice the hypothetical rational, self-interest- 
maximizing persons in the original position would accept, given that 
they have antecedently consented to policies assigning enhanced care 
to the early and middle years, but reducing care to the aged. Parties 
to the original position have disenfranchised themselves, so to speak; 
but it remains to be seen what form they would agree this disen­
franchisement should take.
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Age-Rationing by Denial of Treatment
Although in order to enhance health care available to younger and 
middle-aged people and thus maximize the possibility of each per­
son's reaching a normal life span at all, parties to the original position 
will have already agreed to ration health care to the elderly, they must 
be assumed to have enough general information to see what the 
consequences of this antecedent agreement will be. First, under an 
appropriately thin veil of ignorance, they will know that a given 
measure of health care is not equally effective at all age ranges, but 
much more effective in younger years, much less effective in old age. 
Because old persons typically have more complex medical problems, 
compounded by a decline in the function of many organs and by 
reduced capacities for healing and homeostasis, tradeoffs between 
earlier and later years cannot be made on a one-to-one basis: by and 
large, a unit of medical care consumed late in life will have much less 
effect in preserving life and maintaining normal species-typical func­
tion than a unit of medical care consumed at a younger age. It is this 
that will have, in part, induced the rational self-interest maximizers of 
the original position to consent to an age-rationing policy in the first 
place; but it will also influence how they choose to put an age- 
rationing policy into effect. Once the multiple infirmities of old age 
begin to erode an individual's functioning, comparatively larger 
amounts of health care are likely to be required to raise it again. 
Therapy that can successfully maintain comfort, or restore function­
ing, or preserve life may be very much more expensive in older 
patients, if indeed successful treatment is possible at all.
Parties to the original position will also know that under a rationing 
scheme it will be necessary, given their antecedent distributive deci­
sion, to restrict or eliminate most of the comparatively elaborate kinds 
of care. Presumably, if care is to be denied, it will be the highest-cost, 
least-gain varieties of care, including care that does not directly serve 
to maintain life. Of course, "cheap treatment" such as common 
antibiotics could be retained for elderly patients, since these are low- 
cost and, given their potential for saving life, high-gain; but expen­
sive diagnostic procedures and therapies like CAT scans, NMR, 
dialysis, organ transplants, hip replacements, hydrotherapy, respira­
tory support, total parenteral nutrition, individualized physical ther­
apy, vascular grafting, major surgery, and high-tech procedures 
generally would be ruled out.24 Hospitalization, and the nearly equal 
expensive inpatient hospice care, might not be permitted, except 
perhaps briefly; sustained nursing home care (at $20,000 a year) 
would no doubt also be excluded. When the elderly person over an 
appropriate age ceiling or exceeding a predetermined level of deterio­
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ration begins to show symptoms of a condition more serious than a 
transitory, easily cured illness, he would simply be considered ineligi­
ble for treatment. "I'm sorry, Mr. Smith," we can expect the physician 
to say, "there is nothing more we can do."
Knowing these things, parties to the original position can then 
assess the impact of age rationing by denial of treatment. While they 
will know that age rationing of some of the more expensive, elaborate 
treatment modalities, like renal dialysis and organ transplantation, is 
now prevalent in Britain,25 and is to an uneven extent also evident in 
the United States,26 they will also understand that under the general 
age rationing policy they have agreed to, the frequency and finality of 
such denials of treatment would be much more severe. Although 
allocations to the elderly would, of course, be a fluctuating function of 
scarcity in health care resources as a whole, it is probably fair to 
estimate that were the degree of scarcity approximately equivalent to 
what it is now, a just distribution of health care would demand that a 
very large proportion of all health care expenses now devoted to the 
elderly be reassigned to younger age groups. The elderly now use 
nearly one-third of all health care.27 Were these resources reassigned 
to the younger and middle-aged groups, the probability would dra­
matically increase that all, or virtually all, these persons (except the 
worst-off newborns and those catastrophically injured or killed out­
right in accidents, homicide, or suicide) would not only reach a 
normal life span, but reach it in reasonably good health. Although the 
temporary life expectancy (or average number of years a group of 
persons at the beginning of an age interval will live during that age 
interval) is already very high, especially for the intervals 0-20 and 20­
45,28 it is still the case that a sizeable number of people do not reach a 
normal life span, or reach it only in poor health.29 Reallocation of 
substantial health care resources would do a great deal to change this, 
particularly if the transfers were used for preventive medicine and 
support programs, such as prenatal nutrition and lifestyle change, as 
well as direct assaults on specific diseases. But to achieve this effect, if 
the degree of overall scarcity of medical resources could not be 
altered, a substantial portion of the care now given the elderly would 
have to be withdrawn. At most, perhaps, minimal home hospice care 
and inexpensive pain relief could be routinely granted, together with 
some superficial care in transient acute illness not related to chronic 
conditions or interdependent diseases. But treatment for the elderly 
could not be escalated very much beyond this point if, within a fixed 
degree of scarcity, a just distribution of resources were still to be 
achieved: if only a significantly lesser portion of the care now devoted 
to the elderly were reassigned to younger age groups, there would be 
no substantial redistributive achievement and no significant increase
in the prospects for persons generally for reaching a normal life span. 
Minimal and erratic age-rationing of the sort now practiced in the 
United States would accomplish yirtuaUy no redistributive goal at all.
In some cases, to deny the elderly treatment beyond minimal home 
hospice care and inexpensive pain relief would simply result in earlier 
deaths. This would, presumably, be the case in many sorts of acute 
conditions—heart attacks or sudden-onset renal failure, for in­
stance—where emergency medical intervention is clearly lifesaving. 
But, especially in old age, such starkly life vs. death episodes are less 
likely to occur in isolation; it is much more likely that an elderly 
person will already suffer from a number of related or unrelated 
chronic conditions, each of which could be relieved, at least to some 
degree, by treatment, but which together make a fairly substantial 
and expensive list of complaints. Almost half the persons age 65 or 
older suffer from chronic conditions,30 of which the most frequently 
reported for the noninstitutionalized elderly are arthritis, vision and 
hearing impairments, heart conditions, and hypertension.31 The el­
derly over 85 in the community average 3.5 important disabilities per 
person, and those who are hospitalized 6.32 Some of these chronic 
conditions are extremely common, like visual impairment, arthritis, 
and loss of hearing, but they are not always inexpensive to treat. 
Many of the conditions associated with increasing age, like 
Alzheimer's, certain types of arthritis and cancers, osteoporosis, or 
stroke, may require extended medical, nursing, or rehabilitative care. 
But extended, substantial medical, nursing, and rehabilitative care is 
expensive; consequently, these are precisely the conditions in which, 
in a just health care system under conditions of scarcity, the elderly
Clearly, even hypothetical parties to the original position, under an 
appropriately thin veil of ignorance, will be dismayed by the conse­
quences of the initial distributive decision they have made. Total hip 
replacements, for instance, could no longer be offered the elderly; but 
it will be evident that there is a substantial difference in the character 
of life for an elderly person who remains ambulatory and one no 
longer able to walk. It will be evident, too, that the person who 
needs, but does not receive, a pacemaker or a coronary bypass may 
lead a very restricted life, seriously limited in his activities; and that 
life with renal failure, or cardiac arrhythmias, or pulmonary insuffi­
ciency can be restrictive, painful, or frightening. Indeed, what may be 
most dismaying to those peering through this thin veil of ignorance is 
that elderly persons who are not allocated treatment do not simply 
die; rather, they suffer their illness and disabilities without adequate 
aid. Even symptom control in conditions like cancer, if not simply 
obliterative of consciousness, can be quite expensive, since effective
relief may require constant titration and monitoring; if so, it too 
would presumably be ruled out. Worse still, common antibiotics and 
the few other kinds of cheap treatment that would still be available 
may simply serve to prolong this period of decline, not to reduce its 
discomforts, while labor-intensive care that might make it tolerable— 
like physical therapy or psychiatric support and counseling—would 
also be ruled out. To deny treatment does not always simply bring 
about earlier deaths that maximal care would postpone; denial of 
treatment also means denial of expensive palliative measures, both 
physical and psychological, which maximal care would permit at 
whatever age death occurs.
Nor can it be supposed that to deny care to the elderly is to simply 
allow them to die as their fathers and forefathers did; to deny care 
now is to subject persons to a medically new situation. Not only has it 
been comparatively unlikely, until quite recently, that a person would 
reach old age at all (in the United States, life expectancy at birth in 
1900 was only 47.3 years, compared to 74.5 in 198233), but in the past, 
most deaths were caused by parasitic and infectious diseases, many 
of which were rapidly fatal. Modern sanitation, inoculation, and 
antibiotic therapy have changed that, and for the first time, the 
specter of old age as a constellation of various sublethal but severely 
limiting and discomforting conditions has become the norm. Hence, 
any notion that denial of treatment to the elderly will simply allow a 
return to the more "natural" modes of death enjoyed by earlier, 
simpler generations is a dangerously romanticized misconception. To 
ration health care by denial of treatment is not simply to abandon the 
patient to death, but often to abandon him to a prolonged period of 
morbidity, only later followed by death.
But, of course, this is a prospect that the rational self-interest 
maximizer, behind the veil of ignorance about whether he himself 
will succumb quickly in an acute crisis or be consigned without 
substantial medical assistance to a long-term decline, will be con­
cerned to protect against. Parties to the original position will thus find 
many reasons to reject policies that ration health care by denying 
treatment to the aged; the question for them will be whether they can 
devise better alternative methods.
Squaring the Curve
Since the publication in 1980 of James Fries's provocative article on 
the compression of morbidity,34 there has been a good deal of discus­
sion of the end-of-life morbidity characteristic of old age. Although 
the average life span in the United States has increased more than 26 
years between 1900 and the present, Fries points out, the maximum
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life span has not increased; there is no greater percentage of centenar­
ians, for instance, and there are no documented cases of survival, he 
claims, beyond 114 years. The result is an increasingly "rectangular- 
ized" mortality curve, as more and more people reach old age but the 
maximum old age is not extended. Furthermore, since this rectangu- 
larization results from postponement of the onset of chronic illness, it 
means an increasingly rectangularized morbidity curve as well. On 
this basis, Fries optimistically predicts that the number of extremely 
old persons will not increase, that the average period of diminished 
physical vigor or senescence will decrease, that chronic disease will 
occupy a smaller proportion of the typical life span, and that the need 
for medical care in late life will decrease. Good health, in short, will 
extend closer and closer to the ideal average life span of about 85, but 
life will not be extended much beyond this point.
Fries's conclusions about "squaring the curve," as it is often called, 
have been vigorously disputed by Schneider and Brody,35 among 
others. They see no evidence of declining morbidity and disability in 
any age group, particularly those just prior to old age, but they do 
observe that increasing numbers of people are reaching advanced 
ages, and point out that this fast-growing segment of the population 
is the one most vulnerable to chronic disease. While some writers set 
the biologic limit to the human life span at about 100, much higher
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Figure 4.1. Fries Increasingly Rectangular Survival Curve. About 80% (stippled 
areas) of the difference between the 1900 curve and the ideal curve (stippled 
area plus hatched area) had been eliminated by 1980. Trauma is now the 
dominant cause of death in early life. (From Fries, op. cit., p. 131, fig. 2.) 
Reprinted by courtesy of The New England Journalof Medicine.
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than Fries's original estimate of 85, others believe that there is no such 
limit. In either case, most of these comparatively pessimistic writers 
fear that a large increase in the number of individuals who reach old 
age will mean a large increase in persons who spend long proportions 
of their lives afflicted with chronic disease. Advances in medicine 
will, they believe, prolong old age rather than delay its onset.
Clearly this issue is one with enormous consequences for health 
care planning. But it has been debated as an empirical issue only; 
nowhere has it been recognized that the empirical question cloaks a 
central moral issue as well. What is crucial to note is that both the 
optimist and pessimist parties to this dispute agree, or tacitly agree, 
on one thing: that a squared morbidity curve is a desirable thing. This 
is by no means surprising: the squared curve represents a situation in 
which life is, as Fries puts it, "physically, emotionally, and intellectu­
ally vigorous until just before its close."36 Death without illness, or 
without sustained, long-term illness, rational self-interest maximizers 
would surely agree, is a desirable thing. But if this is so, the empirical 
disagreement between the optimists and the pessimists grows irrele­
vant. For, regardless of whether changes in lifestyle or improvements 
in medical care would naturally flatten or square the mortality and 
morbidity curves, these curves can also be deliberately altered by 
other distributive and policy-based interventions as well—including 
those that implement age-rationing schemes.
Perfect Health
Figure 4.2. The Effect of Denying Treatment in Old Age. The solid line shows 
the morbidity curve characteristic for a representative individual where treat­
ment is supplied; the dashed line shows the conjectural morbidity curve where 
treatment is denied after age 65 in sublethal chronic conditions.
As seen in the previous section, rationing that proceeds by denial 
of treatment may have the effect of not only hastening both the onset 
and termination of the drop-off or downhill slope of the morbidity 
curve—patients become impaired earlier and die sooner—but, in 
many cases, flattening this downslope: the period of senescence, or 
chronic old-age disability, occupies a longer proportion of life, since it 
is endured without treatment. The morally significant feature of 
rationing policies that deny treatment is not simply their effect on 
mortality rates, but their effect on the ways in which people die.
But the curve can also be artificially squared—by deliberately 
bringing about death before the onset of serious morbidity, while the 
quality of life remains comparatively high. This too means that the 
onset and termination of the drop-off slope are both earlier—the 
termination a good deal earlier—but the slope itself is now perpendic­
ular, not gradual, and life is terminated with only incipient decline. 
This is precisely the effect of the primitive and historical practices 
mentioned earlier: senicide, euthanasia, and socially mandated "ra­
tional" suicide, at least where they are practiced early in the downhill 
course of a long-term degenerative disease. The squared curve will be 
produced, of course, by denial of treatment in sudden-onset life- 
threatening conditions, but these are much less characteristic of old 
age, and the more frequent effect of denying treatment is a flattened,
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Figure 4.3. Morbidity Curve of Direct-Termination Practices. Solid line shows 
morbidity curve in old age with treatment, dashed line without treatment, and 
dotted line shows conjectural morbidity curves in direct-termination practices 
such as senicide, early euthanasia, and culturally mandated “ rational” suicide.
prolonged decline. Practices that guarantee a squared curve, on the 
other hand, involve direct killing, and, in particular, killing of per­
sons whose quality of life is still comparatively high; nevertheless, 
these practices do achieve what is agreed by all to be desirable, 
namely, death without prior sustained, long-term disease.
Under the assumptions employed here, parties to the original 
position have antecedently contracted for age-rationing policies, even 
though these will have the effect of reducing the remaining length of 
life for those who reach old age. In virtue of this initial agreement, 
these parties are now also in a position to agree upon the sorts of 
policies by means of which this age rationing will be put into effect. 
Hence, they must choose between treatment-denying policies and 
those that impose death; constrained by their earlier decision in favor 
of age rationing, they no longer have the option of choosing policies 
that allocate extensive resources to the elderly and thus make possible 
the extension of life. To put it in the familiar terms of bioethics, they 
must choose between policies that involve "killing" and those that 
involve "allowing to die," and their agreement will serve to identify 
which policy is more just.
For the most part, the age-rationing practices now followed in 
Britain and the United States, as well as elsewhere, involve denial of 
treatment, for instance in the form of age ceilings for organ trans­
plants, renal dialysis, or joint replacement. But I wish to argue that 
rational self-interest maximizers in the original position would prefer 
the direct-killing practices that are the contemporary analogues of the 
historical and primitive practices of senicide, early euthanasia, and 
culturally-encouraged suicide to those that involve allowing to die. 
Parties to the original position, after all, are fully informed about the 
possible societal consequences of their choices (except about the 
impact on themselves) and are not hesitant, as rational persons, to 
look the circumstances of death squarely in the face. There are, I 
think, two principal reasons why they would agree on direct-termina- 
tion policies involving the causing of death, that is, on "squaring the 
curve."
Avoidance of Suffering
Except for persons who believe, on religious or other grounds, that 
suffering is of intrinsic merit or is of extrinsic value in attaining 
salvation or some other valued goal, rational persons eager to maxi­
mize their self-interests seek to avoid discomfort, disability, and pain. 
Of course, a good deal of suffering may willingly be endured by those 
who hope to survive a critical episode and return to a more normal 
condition of life; but terminal suffering known to be terminal is not
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prized. In medical situations where the prognosis is uncertain and 
sophisticated techniques are employed to support survival, the risk of 
suffering is one the rational person may well wish to take, since the 
odds of survival may be either unknown or large enough to make it 
worth the risk. But under an age-rationing system that proceeds by 
denial of treatment, medical support will be minimal, and hence 
comparatively ineffective in supporting survival; the chance of sur­
vival of an episode of illness is thereby drastically reduced. Thus, the 
possible gains to be achieved by enduring suffering disappear. Will­
ingness to endure suffering may be a prudent, self-interest favoring 
posture in a medical climate in which support is provided—even if 
that support is erratic or the chance of success is unknown—but it is 
not a prudent posture where age rationing precludes nearly all such 
support across the board.
M aximization of Life
Parties to the original position will also give preference to a policy 
that involves an overall distributive gain, benefitting all, but giving 
the greatest benefit to the least advantaged. Since the allocation of 
resources may affect the overall total of resources available, they will 
prefer policies that maximize resources in a just distribution, and it is 
this that "squaring the curve" would accomplish. Of course, individ­
uals surveying the possibility of policies that permit or require the 
direct termination of the existence of human beings may believe that 
their lives are to be sacrificed in the interests of other, younger 
people, and were this the case, they would rightly resist this sort of 
utilitarian tradeoff. But individuals who view these prospective poli­
cies in this way make a fundamental error: they view the effects of 
these policies from their own immediate perspective only, and fail to 
see the larger impact these policies have. Quite the contrary, the 
overall effect of direct-termination policies is to maximize the preserva­
tion of life, not reduce it. This is a function of the fact, as pointed out 
earlier, that medical care is less efficient in old age, more efficient at 
younger ages, and that a unit of medical care consumed late in life 
will have much less effect in preserving life and maintaining normal 
species-typical function than a unit of medical care consumed at a 
younger age. The effect of rationing policies that allocate care away 
from elderly persons to younger ones is to increase the effectiveness 
of these resources, and thus greatly increase the chances for younger 
persons to reach a normal life span. Of course, since mortality in the 
0-20 and 20-45 age ranges is already quite low, the increase in 
temporary life expectancy will be greatest for those 45-65; but, it must 
be remembered, the veil of ignorance for those in the original position
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excludes all but the vaguest knowledge of likelihoods of their own 
positions,37 and any possibly preventable mortality or morbidity in 
these younger age ranges will constitute a situation rational self­
interest maximizers will work to avoid.
Furthermore, and for the same reasons of efficiency, the realloca­
tion decreases by a much smaller amount the chances for older 
persons to live beyond a normal life span, since after all those chances 
were never very great. For example, ten units of medical care given to 
a 92-year-old man with multiple chronic conditions might make it 
possible for him to live an additional two years, but ten units of care 
given to an 8-year-old girl in an acute episode might make it possible 
for her to live a normal life span, or about 64 additional years. The 
mistake the disgruntled elderly individual facing a rationing-manda­
ted death makes is in failing to calculate not only the immediate loss 
he faces, but the benefit he has already gained from policies that have 
enhanced his chances of reaching his current age: his temporary life 
expectancy in the ranges 0-20, 20-45, and 45-65 will have been much 
elevated, even though his total life expectancy may decline. The less 
the care provided at the end of life, and hence the greater amount of 
transfer to earlier ages, the greater his gain in life prospects will have 
been. (Of course, this effect could not be achieved in the first 
generation of the implementation of such policies.) Furthermore, 
direct-termination policies are more effective in maximizing overall 
gains in life saved than denial-of-treatment policies. Since denial-of- 
treatment practices still always involve some costs as persons with 
multiple conditions in interrelated degenerative diseases are granted 
minimal hospice and palliative care during their downhill courses, 
the proportion of savings is smaller, and less is transferred to earlier 
age groups.
Consequently, the disgruntled individual also makes a second 
mistake: he fails to see that because direct termination rather than 
denial of treatment maximizes the amount of transfer to younger age 
groups, such a policy will have maximized his own chances (except in 
the first generation) not just of reaching old age, but of entering it 
with fewer chronic, preexisting conditions. Furthermore, this policy 
will have done the same for all other persons as well. But as the 
number of persons entering old age with chronic conditions de­
creases, the normal life span will tend to increase (at least to any 
natural limit there may be), and with it, the chances of any individ­
ual's reaching this mark. The long-term effect of such policies— 
despite the fact that they involve deliberately causing death in people 
who might continue to live—is to gradually increase the normal life 
span by delaying the onset of seriously debilitating and eventually 
fatal disease.
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The rational person in the original position, then, who counts 
among his self-interests both the avoidance of suffering and the 
preservation of his life, will correctly see that social policies providing 
for the direct termination of his life at the onset of substantial 
morbidity in old age will more greatly enhance his prospects in 
satisfying these self-interests than any alternative open in a scarcity 
situation. After all, as a party to the original position, he has no 
knowledge of his own medical condition or age at any given time. Of 
course, if there were no benefits to older as well as younger persons 
from this reallocation, but rather merely the sacrifice of the interests 
of some people for those of others, parties to the original position 
could not agree to such policies; but this is not the case. Since such 
policies do provide benefits for all, and indeed the greatest benefits 
for the least advantaged (i.e., those who would otherwise die young), 
they will receive the agreement of all rational persons in the original 
position. This agreement, then, provides the basis for counting such 
policies just.
Attitudes Toward Direct-Termination Age Rationing
But of course, the rational self-interest maximizer in the original 
position can consent only to policies that are psychologically benign, 
and that do not impose lifelong anguish or fear; this is because parties 
to the original position are rational in the sense that they will not 
enter into agreements they know they cannot keep, or can do so only 
with great difficulty.38 Age-rationing policies that involve direct killing 
of the elderly may seem to invite just such anguish, as one cowers a 
lifetime in fear of being brutally extinguished by an unscrupulous 
physician or the naked power of the state. Certainly some of the 
primitive and historical policies mentioned earlier have engendered 
just this sort of fear; the early Nazi "euthanasia" program, although 
reserved for Aryans and initially performed with relatives' consent, 
comes to mind.
Nevertheless, whether death in old age is feared or welcomed is 
very much a product of social beliefs and expectations, and these not 
only undergo spontaneous transformations, but can be quite readily 
altered and engineered.39 Transformations in social practices in earlier 
historical periods make it evident that beliefs about whether there is 
such a thing as a time to die can change; transformation can be 
equally well imagined in the present. Aristotle's dictum notwith­
standing, whether death is believed to be the worst of evils, or 
whether some circumstances—extreme incapacitation, inability to 
communicate, or continuous pain—are believed to be worse than 
death is much influenced by the surrounding society. Mary Rose
Barrington speculates about an attitudinal change that, in the contem­
porary cost-conscious climate, seems an increasingly real possibility: 
"What if," she writes, "a time came when, no longer able to look after 
oneself, the decision to live on for the maximum number of years 
were considered a mark of heedless egoism? What if it were to be 
thought that duice et decorum est profamilia m on?”m
Many sorts of prevailing social expectations serving the interests of 
society at large, and hence the long-term interests of individuals, are 
readily cooperated with, even at some immediate and direct cost to 
the individuals involved: for example, expectations about getting 
married, pursuing careers, supporting children, and so on. All of 
these involve a good deal of societal and institutional support. 
Marriage is encouraged, in part, by elaborate ceremonies and reli­
gious services; universities and technical training schools provide not 
only employment skills but socialize students to want to pursue 
careers; the support of children is enforced not only by legal penalties 
for failure to do so, but by extremely strong social sanctions. It is not 
at all difficult to imagine the development of social expectations that 
there is a time to die, or, indeed, that it is a matter of virtue or 
obligation to choose to die.41 To be effective, these expectations would 
presumably be coupled with supportive, social practices—for in­
stance, predeath counseling, physician assistance in providing the 
actual means of inducing death, or ceremonial recognition from such 
institutions as churches. Clearly, societal expectations concerning the 
time to die need not be dysphoric or condemn the members of an age- 
rationing society to lifetimes of anguish or fear. Indeed, Daniels 
suggests that a view very like this characterized Aleut society:
The elderly, or the enfeebled elderly, are sent off to die, sparing the rest 
of the community from the burden of sustaining them. From descrip­
tions of the practice, the elderly quite willingly accept this fate, and it is 
fair that they should .42
Nor need direct-termination rationing policies be viewed as a 
violation of rights. In an age-rationing society, there is no right to live 
maximally on, nor to receive the necessary medical care. Of course, 
an individual may have rights to many sorts of things even in a 
society that rations by age—for instance, a right to termination 
procedures that are dignified and humane. A person will also have 
rights to freedom from abuse (to be discussed in the next section). 
And it will also be the case that younger persons have rights to 
medical care and the prolongation of life. Consequently, direct- 
termination age-rationing policies, fairly applied, would not violate 
that Rawlsian principle of justice that stipulates that each person has 
an equal right to basic rights and liberties compatible with equal
Is There a Duty to Die? 87
rights and liberties for all, since each person will have had an equal 
right to medical prolongation of life and equal liberty to live in his 
younger and middle years, and each person will be equally subject to 
the expectation that his life will come to an end before sustained 
terminal morbidity sets in. This policy does not entail that elderly 
people no longer have rights; they continue to enjoy the rights of 
persons in society, but the right to extensive medical continuation of 
their lives is not among them.
The Issue of Abuse
Not only would rational self-interest maximizers in the original posi­
tion require that any direct-termination rationing policies adopted not 
be dysphoric in their application nor violate rights, but they will also 
require that these policies not invite abuse. To abuse a policy includes 
not only using it to cause harm to individuals, but to alter the 
practices it permits in such a way as to render the policy itself 
inherently unstable. Needless to say, virtually any policy can be 
abused; but some policies invite abuse in a much stronger way, and 
policies permitting or requiring direct killing may seem to make the 
strongest possible invitation of all. The issue, then, is whether parties 
to the original position could devise direct-termination policies that 
resist abuse or provide adequate protection against it.
Direct-termination age-rationing policies would need to incorpo­
rate at least three features as protections against abuse. Without these 
features, rational self-interest maximizers in the original position 
could not consent to them.
Preservation of Choice
First, compliance with direct-termination policies would need to be 
experienced as essentially voluntary at the level of individual choice. 
This does not mean that individual choice would not be shaped by 
more general social expectations, but the individual could not be 
coerced, either legally or socially, into ending his life. Any individual 
who chose to resist the social expectation that it is time to die, and 
hence, to endure the disenfranchisement from treatment that would 
be his lot, would have to be guaranteed the freedom to do so. Hence, 
in such a world, it could not be said that the ill, elderly individual has 
a "duty to die"; what he has is a duty to refrain from further use of 
medical resources. He may then think it prudent to avail himself of 
the support in direct, painless termination of his life that such a 
society would offer, instead of finding himself abandoned to die
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without substantial medical help; but, of course, conceptions of 
prudence may vary from one individual to another. Indeed, if social 
acceptance of direct-termination policies were widespread enough to 
yield sufficient redistributive savings, this would perhaps permit 
giving those few persons who chose to tough it out additional 
medical care; this would underscore the voluntary nature of response 
to a direct-termination social expectation. Preservation of choice is 
crucial because state or societal coercion not only causes harm but 
invites rebellion; it is inherently unstable. Yet, the justice of age- 
rationing in the first place depends on stable enough functioning of 
the scheme so that the distributive gains in overall life prospects are 
actually realized, and a scheme that is clearly unstable enough to 
make such redistributive effects impossible cannot be said to be just.
Rejection of Fixed Time of Death
Second, the timing of direct-termination rationing policies must be 
based on expected time before death, not on a fixed cutoff age such as 
65 (as on the Greek island of Ceos), 72 (the approximate average life 
expectancy), or 85 (Fries's conjecture)—or, for that matter, any other 
fixed age. This is because the underlying purpose of rationing is to 
enhance the length of life span for all members of society; although it 
will most greatly benefit those who would otherwise die earliest, it 
must also benefit the elderly as well. The central mechanism of 
redistributive age rationing is reallocation of treatment from older 
years to younger ones, where treatment is more efficacious and 
where the prospects of a longer life span are enhanced for all, 
especially for those whose life spans would otherwise be quite short. 
But if a fixed age cutoff point for the elderly were selected, whereby 
persons below that cutoff receive full treatment and persons above it 
were expected to end their lives, the original purpose of rationing 
would be undermined. Clearly, the use of a fixed-age cutoff point 
would be extraordinarily inefficient, since it would allocate some 
resources to persons on a clearly terminal course, where the possibil­
ity of extension of life is small, and it would also exterminate life 
where there was no medical treatment required to sustain it. It is not 
old age itself that is medically expensive; it is the last month, six 
months, or year or two of life. Variations in costs and efficacy of 
treatment are not so much a function of time since birth, but time to 
death.43 Many octogenarians are vigorously healthy; so are some 
people in their nineties and beyond. On the other hand, dying can be 
expensive and medical efforts futile even for those whose ages are not 
advanced. Still more importantly, avoidance of a fixed-age cutoff 
point protects the health care system from political encroachments,
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particularly those that seek cost containment or other political objec­
tives by adjusting the cutoff age downward.
Consequently, parties to the original position would not favor a 
fixed-age rationing policy, but rather one which, depending on the 
degree of scarcity, encouraged direct termination via senicide, early 
euthanasia, or rational suicide only during the last month, half-year, 
or year of life. Of course, the precise ante-mortem period can be 
identified with certainly only retrospectively. However, even this 
does not constitute a fully effective counterargument, since it is 
usually possible for the experienced physician to recognize, with at 
least a fair degree of accuracy, the onset of what is likely to be a 
downhill course ending in death—especially in an elderly patient. 
Nevertheless, even if such predictions are sometimes inaccurate, the 
rational self-interest maximizer will still prefer reliance on them in 
order to maximize his opportunities for continuing life and normal 
functioning, something that would be jeopardized much more se­
verely by a rigid age cutoff.
Furthermore, since some declines are comparatively rapid, even if 
not instantaneous, and some prolonged, parties to the original posi­
tion will seek to maximize their overall opportunities not by agreeing 
to a policy in which a fixed amount of time at the end of life is held 
ineligible for care and in which direct termination may be practiced, 
but by supporting a policy in which disenfranchisement begins only 
at the onset of profound illness or irremediable chronic disease. After 
all, the precise duration of a downhill course can rarely be predicted 
with accuracy, although it can typically be accurately predicted that 
the course will indeed be downhill. Consequently, parties to the 
original position will consent to policies that impose disenfranchise­
ment not long after the diagnosis and onset of symptoms of an 
eventually terminal disease, or at least long enough after the onset to 
confirm the diagnosis and for the need for medical care to have 
become pronounced. Hence, the curve would, in fact, never be 
perfectly squared, and individuals would not have their lives discon­
tinued while they remained in full health, but the timing of disen­
franchisement from care and the expectation that it is "time to die" 
would fall just after the onset of a characteristic downhill course. Just 
how far down this slope the cutoff point might come would be a 
function, of course, of the scarcity situation itself, but also of individ­
ual, voluntary choices mentioned above.
Public Awareness
Third, it is crucial that not only parties to the original position, but 
actual persons affected by such policies both know the policies and
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understand the rationale for them; secretive or propagandistic poli­
cies cannot be rationally chosen, nor can ill-founded ones. It is crucial 
for the stability and, hence, justice of "time to die" policies that 
persons affected by them understand their own distributive gain; 
without this understanding, they will remain disgruntled individuals 
who see only their own loss. But individuals who see only their own 
losses under a policy constitute a force for change; this renders the 
policy itself unstable, and an unstable policy cannot operate to 
produce a just distribution. It is crucial that the man-in-the-street who 
reaches old age understands that the very fact that he has been able to 
do so is, in part, the product of his cooperation with policies that have 
him accept the claim that it is time to die when serious morbidity sets 
in. The rational person will choose policies that promise both freedom 
from pain and as long a life as possible; only if the man-in-the-street 
understands the theory and the operations of the policy will he, too, 
be able to see that it accomplishes both.
Conclusion: A Warning
This argument, that in an age-rationing system, direct termination of 
the lives of the elderly more nearly achieves justice than denying 
them treatment, may seem to be of reductio ad absurdum  form, but it is 
not. In a society characterized by substantial scarcity of resources, this 
contemporary analogue of ancient practices is the only fair response. 
However, this view does not—repeat, N O T —entail that contemporary 
society should impose age-rationing or exterminate those among its 
elderly who are in poor health. For one thing, it is by no means clear 
that rationing, either by denial of treatment or direct termination, is 
better than providing full medical care for all the elderly who wish it, 
even at the expense of other social goods. Age rationing is a rationally 
defensible policy only if the alleged scarcity is real and cannot be 
relieved without introducing still greater injustices. But it may well be 
that the very scarcity assumption that gives rise to the issue of justice 
in health care in the first place is not accurate. Certainly, some of the 
pressure on resources could be reduced by pruning waste and by 
greater attention to patients' actual desire for care; a substantial 
amount of health care expense attributable to the paternalistic imposi­
tion of treatment and to "defensive medicine" practices by physicians 
seeking to protect themselves from legal liability could be avoided. 
More importantly, the degree of scarcity in health care resources is 
itself a function of larger distributive choices among various kinds of 
social goods, including education, art, defense, welfare, and so on; 
the position of contemporary society does not resemble the economi­
cally precarious position of most of the primitive societies in which
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direct-termination practices have developed. Consequently, the ap­
propriate response to the apparent cost containment crisis in health 
care is not necessarily to devise just policies for enacting rationing, by 
age or in any other way, but to reconsider the societal priorities 
assigned various social goods. Given a world very much like the 
present one, it may be asked, what ceiling would parties to the 
original position assign to health care? This might obviate the neces­
sity for rationing at all.
Second, a redistributive policy cannot be just without adequate 
guarantees that resources will, in fact, be redistributed as required. To 
deprive the elderly of health care without reassigning the savings in 
the form of health care for younger age groups is not just, and ought 
not to be advertised in this way. Inasmuch as the erratic age rationing 
practiced in the United States (perhaps unlike that in a closed system, 
such as the British National Health Service44) is not tied directly to 
redistribution of this care to others, it can hardly be described as just, 
but rather the product of ordinary, socially entrenched age bias. 
Furthermore, a just rationing system requires a background of just 
institutions to ensure its operation, and neither the United States nor 
Britain can boast a full set of these—nor, for that matter, can any of 
the primitive or historical societies mentioned at the outset. Conse­
quently, although I believe there is a cogent argument for the moral 
preferability of age rationing that involves voluntary but socially 
encouraged killing or self-killing of the elderly as their infirmities 
overcome them, in preference to the medical abandonment they 
would otherwise face, this is in no way a recommendation for the 
introduction of such practices in our present world. As Daniels 
remarks, if the basic institutions of a given society do not comply with 
acceptable principles of distributive justice, then rationing by age may 
make things worse45—and surely age rationing by direct-termination 
practices could make things very much worse indeed. Thus, while I 
think direct-termination practices would be just in a scarcity-charac­
terized ideal world, I also think we should cast a skeptical eye on the 
sorts of arbitrary, unthinking age rationing we are toying with now.
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